Abstract. Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochastic model, the observed values of the goods are random variables centered around the true value of the good. In this case, logarithmic regret is achievable when competing against well behaved adversaries. In the adversarial model, the goods need not be identical and we simply compare our performance against that of the best fixed bid in hindsight. We show that sublinear regret is also achievable in this case and prove matching minimax lower bounds. To our knowledge, this is the first complete set of strategies for bidders participating in auctions of this type.
INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has been a driving force behind most of the recent work on online learning, particularly in the realm of bandit problems. During the first quarter of 2015 alone, internet advertising generated $13.3 billion in revenue, according to the Internet Advertising Bureau. A large fraction of advertising space is sold on platforms known as ad exchanges such as Google's DoubleClick and AppNexus, which facilitate transactions between the owner of advertising space and advertisers. These transactions occur within a fraction of a second using auctions [Mut09] , thus placing the actors squarely within the framework of game-theoretic auctions with a single item and multiple bidders. In this context, we refer to the advertising space as the good, its owner as the seller and the advertisers as bidders, respectively. From the seller's perspective, this is a well understood problem in mechanism design: the Vickrey (a.k.a. second price) auction is optimal in the sense that each bidder bidding their private value constitutes an equilibrium. Because of this property, the Vickrey auction is said to be truthful.
The seller may also maximize her revenue while maintaining truthfulness of the auction by optimizing a reserve price below which no transaction occur. For example, when the bidders' values are drawn independently from known distributions, the optimal reserve price may be computed in closed form [Mye81, RS81] . The independence assumption was questioned already by Myerson [Mye81] and it was shown later [CM88] that when the assumption is violated, the seller can take advantage of the situation to extract more revenue at the cost of a more complicated auction mechanism. In particular, this mechanism allows bidders to be charged even if they do not win the auction, which is arguably undesirable.
In short, the Vickrey auction is a reasonable compromise between simplicity and optimality, which likely explains its prevalence on ad exchanges. Nevertheless, it suffers from a major limitation: it relies on perfect knowledge of the bidders' value distributions, which are unlikely to be known to the seller in practice [Wil87] . This limitation has driven a recent line of work on approximately optimal auctions [RTCY12, HR09, FHH13] that are robust to misspecification of these distributions. In recent years the ubiquitous collection of data has presented new opportunities, insofar as unknown quantities, such as the bidders' value distributions or relevant functionals, may potentially be learned from past observations. This new paradigm has been investigated in several recent papers: [CBGM13, CHN14, FHHK14, OS11, CR14, ACD + 15, KN14, DRY15, BMM15, MM14, ARS14]. One of the take-home messages of this literature is that a few observations are sufficient to maximize the seller's revenue in the Vickrey auction. This not surprising since all that needs to be learned is the reserve price.
Strikingly, all the aforementioned work adopts the seller's perspective and focuses on designing mechanisms to maximize the seller's revenue. In this work, we take the perspective of a bidder engaged in repeated Vickrey auctions. In the present paper, we identify and analyze several strategies that can be employed by a bidder in order to maximize his reward while simultaneously learning the value of a good sold repeatedly. This paradigm can be expressed as a learning problem with partial feedback, or bandit problem [BCB12] . We are aware of only one other paper that takes the bidder's perspective [McA11] where using bandit strategies for bidding is suggested. Repeated auctions have been studied in the bandit framework, primarily in the context of truthful bandits [DK09, BKS10, BSS09] . However, this line of literature also takes the seller's point of view and aims at designing an auction mechanism rather than designing an optimal bidding strategy under the constraint of a simple mechanism such as the Vickrey auction.
More generally, the problem we describe falls into the category of partial monitoring games, in which the learner receives only limited feedback about the loss associated with a given action. By analyzing the feedback structure of such games, it is possible to develop essentially optimal algorithms for many games in this class [BFP + 14] . However, the performance guarantees of these algorithms degrade drastically as the number of actions increases. This renders these results unusable in our context, where the bidder's number of moves at each stage is essentially unbounded. . In case of ties, the winner is chosen uniformly at random among the highest bidders.
SEQUENTIAL VICKREY AUCTIONS
Each bidder k ∈ [K +1] has a private but unknown individual value v[k] ∈ [0, 1], which represents the utility of the good. Note that this value is independent of the auction itself and is only measured by the bidder once the good is delivered to him. For example, in the case of advertising space, this value may be measured by the expected profit generated from this ad or the probability that it generates a click [McA11] . The reward of the winner is given by his net utility v[k ] − m , while the reward of a loosing bidder is 0.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the Vickrey auction is that it is optimal for bidder k to be truthful, that is to bid b[k] = v[k] (assuming that the bidder knows this value). Here optimality is understood in the equilibrium sense: any other bid b[k] = v[k], even random, could never lead to a strict improvement in expected utility and might lead to a net loss for that bidder. An implicit crucial assumption for the implementability of this bidding strategy is that each bidder must know his own value, a hypothesis that is not necessarily met in online repeated auctions. Nevertheless, a bidder may learn the value v[k] from past observations. Like bandit problems, this problem exhibits an exploration-exploitation tradeoff: Higher bids increase the number of observations and thus give the bidder a more accurate estimate of the value v[k] (exploration) while bids closer to the best estimate of the value at time t are more likely to be optimal in the sense described above (exploitation). We will see that auctions when viewed as bandit problems possess an idiosyncratic information feedback structure: information is collected only for higher bids, but these should be avoided due to the phenomenon known as the winner's curse [Wil69] .
We consider a set of T ≥ 2 goods t ∈ [T ] := {1, . . . , T } that are sold sequentially in a Vickrey auction. Using a slight abuse of terminology, we will also call the auction at which good t is sold auction t. We take the point of view of bidder 1, hereafter referred to as the bidder, and denote respectively by v t , b t , m t ∈ [0, 1] the unknown private value of the bidder for the t th good, his bid and the maximum bid of all other bidders for this good. Without loss of generality 1 , we assume that bids are never equal. At time t ≥ 2, the bidder is aware of the outcomes of past auctions 2 {(b s , m s ), s ∈ [t − 1]} as well as a (potentially noisy) measurement of the values of goods [t − 1] at times when the bidder won the auction. Our goal is to construct bidding strategies that mitigate potential losses (overbidding) and opportunity cost (underbidding) for the bidder.
We consider two generating processes for the sequence of values {v t } t : stochastic and adversarial. The stochastic setup is the most benign one: consecutive values {v t } t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables in the unit interval [0, 1] . On the other side of the stationarity spectrum is the adversarial setup, where the sequence {v t } t may be any sequence in [0, 1] . This framework has become quite standard in the online learning literature [CBL06, BCB12] where a game-theoretic setup prevails and arbitrary dependencies between rounds occur.
THE STOCHASTIC SETUP
Recall that consecutive values {v t } t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables in the unit interval [0, 1]. Let v = IE[v t ] denote the common expected value of these random variables. It is easy to see that the expected net utility of the bidder at time t, IE(v t −m t )1{b t > m t }, is maximized at b t ≡ v. Therefore, a constant bid equal to v is optimal among all sequences of deterministic bids. This implies that the Vickrey auction is truthful in expectation. Since v is unknown, the bidder may not be able to achieve the best net utility over t rounds, so his performance is measured by his (cumulative) pseudo-regret 3R T defined by
where the expectations are taken with respect to the randomness in v t and possibly in m t if the other bidders are playing randomly. Regret and pseudo-regret as measures of performance are studied primarily in the bandit literature but rarely in the context of auctions. Interestingly, using regret as a measure of performance allows us to take opportunity cost into account. Indeed, a net utility of zero can be obtained trivially at any round by bidding zero, but if the other bidders tend to bid below the value of the good, the regret will still scale linearly in T .
Algorithm 1 UCBid
We introduce a bidding strategy called UCBid because it is inspired by the UCB algorithm [LR85, ACBF02] but tailored to the auction setup under investigation (See Algorithm 1). For the first auction, it prescribes to place the bid b 1 = 1 and thus win the auction. At auction t + 1, t ≥ 1, this strategy prescribes to place the bid b t+1 defined by
where ω t is the number of auctions won up to stage t and v ωt = ωt s=1 v τs /ω t with τ s being the stage of the s th won auction. Interestingly, the UCBid strategy does not require the knowledge of past bids of other bidders {m 1 , . . . , m t−1 }. This feature is particularly attractive in the setup of ad exchanges, where the process takes place so fast that it may be useful for the platform to not communicate the cost of an auction to bidders until the end of the day, for example. While the implementation of the UCBid strategy does not require the knowledge of {m t } t , its performance is affected by other bids that are larger but close to the optimal bid v. This is not surprising as such bids force the bidder to overpay in order to collect information about the unknown v. However, sub-linear regret of order √ T is achievable regardless of the sequence {m t } t . We prove two results that show that this strategy automatically adapts to more favorable sequences {m t } t . such that m t is independent of v t , the UCBid strategy yields pseudo-regret bounded as follows:
Pseudo-regret bounds
where x ∧ y = min(x, y) and ∆ ∈ [0, 1] is the largest number such that no bid m t is the interval (v, v + ∆).
Proof. Since v t is independent of (m t , b t ) and IE[v t ] = v, we havē
where in the second equality we used the fact that the supremum is attained at
, where x + = max(x, 0). Next, decomposing the regret on the the events {b t > m t } and {b t < m t }, on which the bidder won and lost auction t respectively, we get
This yieldsR
To control the first sum, using a union bound and Hoeffding's inequality, we get
so that
Denote by ω t the value of ω during the tth round. To control the second sum in (3.2), observe that, since b t > m t implies that the bidder won auction t, we have ω t+1 = ω t + 1. Denote by W = {t ∈ [T ] : b t > m t } the set of auctions that the bidder has won. If m t ≥ v + ∆, we have
Using Hoeffding's inequality, we get
It yields, on the one hand, that for any t ∈ [T ],
On the other hand, if t > t ∆ := 6(log T )/∆ 2 , we have
It yields
Theorem 1 shows an interesting phenomenon: While UCB type strategies are usually very sensitive to the assumption that the rewards are stochastic, this strategy is actually robust to any sequence {m t } t that may be generated by other bidders, including malicious ones, as long as m t is independent of the stochastic value v t for all t. Indeed, in this hybrid setup, where the v t 's are random but the m t 's may not be, the UCBid strategy exhibits a sublinear regret that can even be logarithmic in the favorable case where no bid m t is the interval (v, v + ∆) for some ∆ > 0. It turns out that this condition can be softened and can be well captured by a simple margin condition under the assumption that the m t 's are also stochastic.
Margin condition
Assume in the rest of this section that m 1 , . . . , m T iid ∼ µ for some unknown probability measure µ. Borrowing terminology from binary classification [MT99, Tsy06] , we define the margin condition as follows. Definition 1. A probability measure µ on [0, 1] satisfies the margin condition with parameter α > 0 around v ∈ (0, 1) if there exists a constant C µ > 0 such that
The parameter α is an indication of the difficulty of the problem-the larger the α, the easier the problem. Under the margin condition, we can interpolate between between the two bounds for the regret-O(log T ) and O( √ T log T )-that arise in Theorem 1. satisfies the margin condition with parameter α > 0 around v ∈ (0, 1), the UCBid strategy yields pseudo-regret bounded as follows:
where c 1 , c 2 and c 3 are positive constants that depend on α, v and C µ .
Proof. We will prove the following bound:
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that
where we used the fact that bids always belong to [0, 1] . Using the margin condition, we get that for α ≥ 0
Hoeffding's inequality yields that IP{v t − v ≥ ε} ≤ e −2tε 2 , thus we get that
As a consequence, if α ≤ 1, we obtain
and for α < 1, this yields that
while, for α = 1, we get
For bigger values of α, we shall use the fact that if the margin condition is satisfied for α ≥ 2, then it is also satisfied for the value α = 2. As a consequence, plugging the value α = 2 in the above equation, we obtain that S ≤ 6 log(T ) 1 + 2C µ + 4C µ + 1 .
As we can see from Theorem 2, the margin parameter α allows us to interpolate between O(log T ) and O( √ T ) regret bounds. Since UCBid does not require the knowledge of α, we say that it is adaptive to the margin parameter α.
In fact, the above result holds, with the exact same proof, under a weaker assumption. Denote by µ t the law of m t conditional on the past history {b s , v s , m s } s≤t−1 . Then the conclusions of Theorem 6 remain true if all µ t satisfy the margin condition with respect to the same parameters α and C µ .
Lower bound
We now show that the family of rates-indexed by α-is optimal up to logarithmic terms. As we shall see the upper bound is tight already in the case where the bid {m t } t are i.i.d., independent of {v t }.
We first consider the case where α ∈ (0, 1). For any α in this interval, let µ α denote the distribution on [0, 1] with density g α with respect to the Lebesgue measure, where g α is defined by
where C α is an appropriate normalizing constant. (In what follows, C α > 0 is a constant that may change from line to line but depends on α only.) See Figure 1 for a representation of this density.
Observe that µ α satisfies the margin condition with parameter α > 0 around v. For α ≥ 1, define the distribution µ α to be the point mass at 1/2 + ε. This distribution also satisfies the margin condition with parameter α.
Let ν denote the joint distribution of (v t , m t ) and denote byR T (ν) the pseudo-regret associated to a strategy when the expectation in (3.1) is taken with respect to ν. Proof. We first consider the case where α < 1. Recall from (3.1) that the pseudo-regret is given byR T = IE T t=1 r t where r t denotes the instantaneous regret, defined by
Note first that under ν or ν we can restrict our attention to strategies that bid b t ≥ 1/2. Observe first that since v = 1/2 under ν, the definition of the pseudo-regret (3.1) simplifies to
where
We will use the fact that IE ν S α+1 ≥ (2ε) α+1 S(ε) and IE ν S α ≤ (2ε) α T + S(ε), where
Next, for any strategy, define the associated test ψ t ∈ {ν, ν } by ψ = ν ifb t ≤ ε and ψ = ν if b t > ε. One the one hand, under ν, the instantaneous regret r t satisfies
On the other hand, under ν , the instantaneous regret r t satisfies
The last two displays yield
It follows from Sanov's inequality (see, e.g., [BPR13] , Lemma 4) that
Moreover, since (i) m t has the same distribution under both ν and ν and (ii), v t is observed only when b t ≥ m t , we get
where we used the fact that ε ≤ (2 √ 2) −1 in the first inequality. Together with (3.3) and (3.4), the above two displays yield
for ε such that (2ε) 2+α T ≤ 1. We obtain
The infimum is achieved when
for all ε ≤ 
as desired.
When α ≥ 1, we obtain the following analogue to (3.3):
The rest of the proof is the same apart from some small changes. Since v t is only observed when b t ≥ 1/2 + ε, we obtain the bound
This yieldsR
The infimum is attained at the same value of S, which implies
for all ε < 1/4. Choosing ε = O(1) yields the claim.
THE ADVERSARIAL SETUP
In this section, unlike the stochastic case, we make no assumptions on the sequences {v t } t and {m t } t , even allowing the seller and other bidders to coordinate their plays according to a nonstationary process. As in the stochastic case, we compare the performance of a sequence {b t } t of bids generated by a data-driven strategy to the best fixed bid in hindsight. As a consequence the (cumulative) regret R T of the bidder for not knowing his own sequence of values is defined as
As in the stochastic case, we will also consider the pseudo-regretR T , defined in (3.1), which is easier to handle and will serve as an an illustration of the techniques used in our proofs. [CBL06, BCB12] , that is, when it generates its sequence of moves independently of the past actions of the bidder. In the sequel, we study both oblivious and non-oblivious (a.k.a. adaptive) adversaries.
Clearly,R T ≤ IE[R T ] and it is well known thatR T = IE[R T ] when the adversary is oblivious
We henceforth consider a shifted version of the auction described above where the reward associated to bid b at time t is given by
Shifting the reward of the game in this way does not affect the regret, but it has the convenient effect that the bidder's net utility at each round is positive.
For notational convenience, assume hereafter that m t ∈ (0, 1] and that v t ∈ [0, 1]. Precluding m t = 0 has no effect on the problem if we replace m t = 0 by an arbitrarily small value.
Oblivious adversaries

Algorithm 2 ExpTree
Select ∈ L with probability p and b ∼ Unif( ) Bid bt =    1 with probability η 0 with probability η b with probability 1 − 2η
end for end for
One popular strategy for adversarial partialinformation problems of this kind is the celebrated Exp3 algorithm [ACBFS03] . However, Exp3 and similar approaches are tailored to problems with a fixed number of actions. In the auction setup, by contrast, the number of actions is a priori unbounded, and even the number of actions up to equivalence grows with T . Standard tools are therefore incapable of achieving sublinear regret in this regime. In Algorithm 2, we present a novel strategy for bandit games of this type that allows the number of actions to grow over time.
The algorithm maintains a sequence of nested partitions L t , t ≥ 1 of (0, 1] into t intervals of the form (x, y] for 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. We set L 1 = (0, 1] and the refinement of the partition L t is done as follows. Let¯ = (x, y] ∈ L t be the unique interval in L t such that m t ∈¯ . Then¯ is split into two subintervals
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2 . Each element ∈ L t is assigned a probability p ,t defined in (4.8) below and such that p ,t > 0 and ∈Lt p ,t = 1. At round t, the ExpTree strategy prescribes to bid randomly as follows. With constant probability, bid 0 or 1. Otherwise, first draw ∈ L t with probability p ,t and then draw a bid b t ∼ Unif( ) uniformly over the interval . We denote the resulting distribution of b t by B t and by IP Bt the associated probability. Note that B t is a mixture of uniform distributions that can be computed explicitly given p ,t , ∈ L t : 
It is not hard to check that IE bt∼Bt [ĝ(b, t)] = g(b, t). Moreover, this estimate is constant on each interval ∈ L t+1 and depends only on whether m t (i.e., m t ≤ x for all x ∈ ) or m t . As a result, overloading the notation, we define the following estimate for the gain of a bid in the interval :
With this estimate, we can compute p ,t+1 , ∈ L t+1 using exponential weights:
for some tuning parameter η > 0 to be chosen carefully. The reweighing by the length | | of the interval in (4.8) is the main novelty of our algorithm. Proof. Any choice η ≤ 1/2 guarantees that the probability distribution B t constructed above is valid. Moreover, when log(1/∆ • )/T > 1, the claimed bound is vacuous, so we can assume that η = (1/2) log(1/∆ • )/T . Define W t = κ∈Lt |κ|w κ,t . By extending the definition (4.8) of p ,t to all ∈ L t+1 , we can write
By construction, ηĝ( , t) ≤ 1. Since e x ≤ 1 + x + x 2 for x ≤ 1, this implies
It follows from (4.6) that
Of course, the same holds for l so that IP Bt (b t ∈ ) = (1 − 2η)p ,t for all ∈ L t+1 . Moreover, it follows from (4.7) that
Since g(b t , t) ≤ 1, we also have
These two inequalities yield respectively
and
Combining the above two displays with (4.10) yields
Rearranging and noting that W 0 = 1, we obtain
Finally, since G(b) ≤ T , we obtainR
Plugging in the given value of η yields the claim. 
Note that choosing a value of η appears to require knowledge of ∆ • and T in advance. However, the socalled "generic doubling trick" allows the bidder to learn these values adaptively at the price of a constant factor [HK10] . In the partial information case, this change also requires replacing ∆ • , the width of an interval containing an optimal bid, by ∆, with width of the narrowest interval.
We initialize two bounds, B T = 1 and B ∆ = 1, and run ExpTree with parameter η = (1/2) B ∆ /B T ∧ 1 2 until either t ≤ B T or log 1/∆ ≤ B ∆ fails to hold. When one of these bounds is breached, we double the bound and restart the algorithm, maintaining the partition L t but setting w = 1 for all ∈ L t . This modified strategy yields the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The strategy ExpTree run with the above doubling procedure yields an expected regret bound R T ≤ 48 2T log(1/∆) .
Proof. Divide the algorithm into stages on which B T and B ∆ are constant, and denote by B T and B ∆ the values of B T and B ∆ when the algorithm terminates. The proof of Theorem 4 implies that the expected regret incurred during any given stage is at most
It remains to sum these regrets over each stage, since the actual expected regret (which requires a fixed bid across all stages) can only be smaller. Suppose that the algorithm lasted a total of + m + 1 stages, of which were ended because the bound t ≤ B T was violated and m of which were ended because the bound log(1/∆) ≤ B ∆ was violated. The total regret across all + m + 1 stages is bounded by
Moreover, when the algorithm terminates, we have the bounds B T ≤ T and B ∆ ≤ 2 log(1/∆). The result follows.
Adaptive adversaries
Theorem 4 establishes an upper bound on the pseudo-regret against any adversary. Moreover, when the adversary is oblivious, the same bound holds for the expected regret. When the adversary is adaptive, however, achieving a bound on the expected regret requires a slightly modified algorithm, Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 2 chiefly in the method of calculating the estimated gain in (4.7). In place ofĝ( , t), ExpTree.P employs a biased estimateg( , t) defined by
The following theorem holds. 
, γ = 2η, and β = log T 2T yields R T ≤ 2 8T log(1/∆ • ) + 3 2T log T log(1/δ) , with probability at least 1 − δ. Moreover,
(b, t) the cumulative true and estimated gains for a bet b. Before proving Theorem 6, we establish the following lemma, which shows thatG can be viewed as an upper bound on G. Proof. Denote by IE t expectation with respect to the random choice of b t , conditioned on the outcomes of rounds 1, . . . , t − 1. Fix b ∈ [0, 1] and define d(b, t) = g(b, t) −g(b, t). Note that
This immediately immediately yieldsd(b, t) ≤ g(b, t) ≤ 1. Since β ≤ 1, and e x ≤ 1 + x + x 2 for x ≤ 1, we have
It follows from (4.12) that
Combining this with the preceding inequality and the fact that
where the last step follows by conditioning on each stage in turn and applying the above bound. 
Applying the Markov bound yields the claim.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4. Note that the choice of η guarantees that B t is a valid probability distribution.
As above, define W t = κ∈Lt |κ|w κ,t . We have
Since ηg( , t) ≤ η 1+β γ ≤ 1, the inequality e x ≤ 1 + x + x 2 for x ≤ 1 implies
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4, we have
and similarly
To compute this last quantity, note that (4.11) implies
where in the last inequality, we used the fact g(b t , t) ≤ 1 andg(b t , t) ≤g(1, t) +g(0, t). Combining the above bounds yields log W t+1 W t ≤ η 1 − 2γ (g(b t , t) + 2β) + η 2 1 − 2γ
(1 + β)(g(1, t) +g(0, t)).
DefiningḠ =
T t=1 g(b t , t) and summing on T yields log
(1 + β)(G(1, T ) +G(0, t))
We bound W T by writing log W T ≥ log ∆ • + η max for any deterministic strategy. The claim follows for general strategies by averaging over the bidder's internal randomness and applying Fubini's theorem.
We are now in a position to prove a tight minimax lower bound. Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that ∆ is a power of 2, since this can change the regret by at most a constant.
Set n = log 2 (1/2∆). We divide the game into n stages of T n rounds each and will show that any bidder incurs regret of at least In general, for the ith stage we will apply Lemma 2 with m = 1/4 + c i 2 −i−1 for some c i . If the U adversary has higher regret in expectation at that stage, then c i+1 = 2c i + 1; otherwise c i+1 = 2c i − 1. Note that during the ith stage, the smallest gap between two of the adversary's bids is 2 −i−1 .
The structure of the optimum bids for the adversaries U and L guarantees that during each stage, there is an interval within which a fixed bid would be optimal for all previous stages. So after n stages there is a fixed bid that is optimal for all n adversaries. Therefore the regret across the n stages is equal to the sum of the regrets for each stage, and we obtain 
CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Building on established strategies for the bandit problem, we propose a first set of strategies tailored to online learning in repeated auctions. Depending on the model, stochastic or adversarial, we obtain several regret bounds ranging from O(log T ) to O( √ T ) and exhibit a reasonable family of models where regret boundsÕ(T β/2 ) are achievable for all β ∈ (0, 1).
In both setups, several questions are beyond the scope of this paper and are left open.
